Where We’re Going, We Don’t Need Drivers: Autonomous Vehicles and AI-Chaperone Liability by Kim, Peter Y.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 69 
Issue 2 Spring 2020 Article 9 
10-19-2020 
Where We’re Going, We Don’t Need Drivers: Autonomous Vehicles 
and AI-Chaperone Liability 
Peter Y. Kim 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peter Y. Kim, Where We’re Going, We Don’t Need Drivers: Autonomous Vehicles and AI-Chaperone Liability, 
69 Cath. U. L. Rev. 341 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol69/iss2/9 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
Where We’re Going, We Don’t Need Drivers: Autonomous Vehicles and AI-
Chaperone Liability 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2020; B.A., Boston College, 2009. The 
author gives thanks to God for giving him purpose, his family and friends for their lovingkindness, 
Professor Kathryn Kelly for her mentorship and priceless guidance, and the Catholic University Law 
Review editors and staffers for their care and support in revising this Comment. 
This comments is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol69/iss2/9 
 
341 
WHERE WE’RE GOING, WE DON’T NEED DRIVERS: 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND AI-CHAPERONE 
LIABILITY 
Peter Y. Kim+ 
Unwittingly, Iggy Pop’s “The Passenger” prophetically envisions what a 
world filled with autonomous vehicles may look like: 
Get into the car 
We’ll be the passenger 
We’ll ride through the city tonight 
See the city’s ripped backsides 
We’ll see the bright and hollow sky 
We’ll see the stars that shine so bright 
The sky was made for us tonight[.]1 
In the near future, drivers will no longer need to be human.2  Already, “the 
segment of the population ages [eighteen] to [twenty-nine], the mobile, Uber-
savvy generation that makes up the largest share of the workforce” is foregoing 
car ownership and the need to be in the driver’s seat.3  Reports indicate that 
                                                 
 + J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2020; B.A., Boston College, 
2009.  The author gives thanks to God for giving him purpose, his family and friends for their 
lovingkindness, Professor Kathryn Kelly for her mentorship and priceless guidance, and the 
Catholic University Law Review editors and staffers for their care and support in revising this 
Comment. 
 1. Iggy Pop, The Passenger Lyrics, LYRICS.COM, https://www.lyrics.com/lyric/ 
2767005/Iggy+Pop/The+Passenger (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).  Iggy Pop partially was inspired to 
write “The Passenger” because of his journey “around North America and Europe in David 
[Bowie]’s car ad infinitum[,]” when he neither owned a car nor possessed a driver’s license.  Kevin 
EG Perry, Josh Homme on Iggy Pop: ‘Lemmy Is Gone. Bowie Is Gone. He’s the Last of the One-
and-Onlys’, GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/ 
mar/05/iggy-pop-and-josh-homme-talk-about-their-post-pop-depression-album. 
 2. The U.S. Department of Transportation has six principles to establish a “clear and 
consistent Federal approach to shaping policy for automated vehicles,” including to modernize 
regulations by “adapt[ing] the definition of ‘driver’ and ‘operator’ to recognize that such terms do 
not refer exclusively to a human, but may in fact include an automated system.”  U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP., PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION: AUTOMATED VEHICLES 3.0 iv 
(2018), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/policy-initiatives/automated-
vehicles/320711/preparing-future-transportation-automated-vehicle-30.pdf [hereinafter DOT]. 
 3. See Faiz Siddiqui, Behind Metro’s Diving Ridership: A Millennial Exodus, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 15, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2018/09/15/guess-
whos-killing-metro/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.66cbd15c4dd7 (noting the “decline of urban rapid 
transit infrastructure and the rise of alternatives such as Uber and Lyft, bike sharing and mobility 
trends like electric scooters”); Self-Driving Technology May Impact Auto Injury Litigation, 
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millennials are spending less time in cars with fewer of them getting driver’s 
licenses, and they are readier than older Americans for the switch to autonomous 
vehicles.4  As a countercultural ideal begins to take hold, America is about to be 
in for the ride of her life:5 “Our republic of drivers is poised to become a nation 
of passengers.”6 
Alongside society’s shifting relationship with the car, three types of 
autonomous vehicles are developing: “traditional cars with increasingly 
sophisticated driver assistance features; cars that have operator controls but can 
also be fully autonomous; and fully-autonomous vehicles with no steering 
wheels, accelerators or brake pedals.”7  The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) forecasts that completely autonomous vehicles “will 
integrate onto U.S. roadways by progressing through six levels of driver 
assistance technology advancements in the coming years.”8  These six levels are 
depicted in the Society of Automotive Engineers Automation Levels diagram.9 
                                                 
18 CLASS ACTION REP. 1, 3 (2016) (“[V]ehicle ownership patterns are expected to change, as 
jitney-like services allow some households to go from owning multiple cars to owning just one.”). 
 4. Robert Moor, What Happens to American Myth When You Take the Driver Out of It?, 
N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 17, 2016), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/10/is-the-self-
driving-car-un-american.html (“A recent survey found that among the kids a generation behind [the 
millennials], only a third believe that ‘a car represents freedom,’ and just [six] percent believe that 
a car is ‘a reflection of who they are.’”). 
 5. See id. (“The experience of driving a car has been the mythopoeic heart of America for 
half a century.”). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Self-Driving Technology May Impact Auto Injury Litigation, supra note 3, at 3.  “To date, 
a variety of terms (e.g., self-driving, autonomous, driverless, highly automated) have been used by 
industry, government, and observers to describe various forms of automation in surface 
transportation.”  DOT, supra note 2, at vi.  This Comment primarily will use “autonomous” to 
describe this technology. 
 8. Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles-safety (last visited Sept. 29, 
2019). 
 9. Id. 
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Although most vehicles on the road today are at Level Zero—No 
Automation,10 some experts predict more than “[ninety percent] of all vehicles 
sold will be ‘Highly’ and ‘Fully’ autonomous” by 2040.11  The U.S. Department 
of Transportation (DOT) has taken note.  Secretary Elaine L. Chao wrote that 
autonomous vehicles have “the potential to improve our quality of life and 
enhance the mobility and independence of millions of Americans, especially 
older Americans and people with disabilities.”12  Conferring with key 
transportation stakeholders (e.g., automotive and technology companies), DOT 
plans to usher in a “policy framework” that safely integrates autonomous 
vehicles to America’s transportation systems.13  Lawyers should take a seat at 
the table for this conversation because only they can develop a matching legal 
framework. 
Inevitably, car crashes will involve autonomous vehicles, and passengers’ 
lawyers will need to litigate whether the “complex systems failed, and 
potentially bring claims related to the vehicles’ sensors, software and data 
inputs[.]”14  Lawyers will also need to defend against such allegations when 
these complex systems worked perfectly and there were alternative reasons for 
the crash, such as human error.15  Even though “automation has the potential to 
impact safety significantly[,]”16 the technology will be challenged when courts 
begin to decide “who gets held liable when the tech kills” people or when it fails 
to save them.17 
                                                 
 10. Gene Munster & Austin Bohlig, Auto Outlook 2040: The Rise of Fully Autonomous 
Vehicles, LOUP VENTURES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://loupventures.com/auto-outlook-2040-the-rise-
of-fully-autonomous-vehicles/ (“Today, 99.9% of all passenger and light commercial vehicles on 
the road have little to no automation capabilities.”). 
 11. Id. (NHTSA classifies “Highly” and “Fully” “as Level [Four] and [Five] automation, 
respectively.”). 
 12. Elaine L. Chao, Letter from the Secretary, in DOT, supra note 2, at ii (“[A]utomation 
brings . . .  legitimate concerns about the safety, security, and privacy of automated technology.”). 
 13. Id. at ii–iii (“Working together, we can help usher in a new era of transportation 
innovation and safety, and ensure that our country remains a global leader in automated 
technology.”). 
 14. Self-Driving Technology May Impact Auto Injury Litigation, supra note 3, at 1 
(“Automated systems in self-driving cars will reduce vulnerability to human error, the cause of 
most crashes[.]”). 
 15. See Elie Mystal, Self-Driving Uber Finally Kills Somebody, and I for One Welcome the 
Coming Test of Their Liability Shield, ABOVE THE L. (Mar. 19, 2018, 6:35 PM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/03/self-driving-uber-finally-kills-somebody-and-i-for-one-
welcome-the-coming-test-of-their-liability-shield/. 
 16. Chao, in DOT, supra note 2, at ii (commenting that automation could ultimately “reduc[e] 
crashes caused by human error, including crashes involving impaired or distracted drivers, and 
sav[e] lives”). 
 17. Mystal, supra note 15. 
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On March 18, 2018, an autonomous vehicle owned by Uber “struck and 
killed” Elaine Herzberg.18  Although the vehicle’s sensors detected the 
pedestrian “seconds before hitting her, [the vehicle] did not stop because the 
system used to automatically apply brakes in potentially dangerous situations 
had been disabled” by Uber.19  The first test on liability for autonomous vehicles 
was extinguished within ten days when Uber provided Herzberg’s family a 
settlement.20 
This Comment explores the untested legal question of whether an injury 
caused by an autonomous vehicle, powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI), 
should be categorized under traditional tort law.  Part I examines relevant and 
analogous case law for intentional torts, negligence, and products liability.  This 
Section includes a few other legal concepts that assist in understanding the 
current legal landscape.21  Part II analyzes how an injury caused by an 
autonomous vehicle should be examined through the lens of traditional tort law.  
This Section tests the prima facie case for the traditional torts of battery, 
negligence, products liability, and vicarious liability as applied to injuries caused 
by autonomous vehicles.  Part III both suggests that current tort law does not do 
a sufficient job in describing potential liability for an injury caused by 
autonomous vehicles and provides an alternative analytical scheme to expand 
existing tort law with AI-Chaperone Liability.  This Section presents a prima 
facie case for AI-Chaperone Liability and offers a hypothetical situation for how 
it could be applied.  Part IV concludes by providing several ways to introduce 
AI-Chaperone Liability to tort law. 
                                                 
 18. Tom Krisher, Uber Self-Driving SUV Saw Pedestrian but Did Not Brake, Federal Report 
Finds, CHI. TRIB. (May. 24, 2018, 8:42 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-uber-
self-driving-uber-car-report-20180524-story.html.  Video recording from the accident “showed a 
distracted safety driver failing to react in time as the vehicle barreled into the pedestrian[.]”  Mike 
Isaac et al., Uber’s Vision of Self-Driving Cars Begins to Blur, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/19/technology/uber-self-driving-cars.html. 
 19. Krisher, supra note 18.  “Uber [disabled] Volvo’s built-in automatic emergency braking 
system to avoid clashes with its own tech.  This is standard practice” to avoid the vehicle having 
more than “one master.”  Aarian Marshall & Alex Davies, Uber’s Self-Driving Car Saw the Woman 
It Killed, Report Says, WIRED (May 24, 2018, 3:38 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/uber-self-
driving-crash-arizona-ntsb-report/. 
 20. Kiara Alfonseca, Uber Reaches Settlement with Family of Woman Killed by Self-Driving 
Car, NBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2018, 11:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/uber-
reaches-settlement-family-woman-killed-self-driving-car-n861131 (“The family of the woman 
killed . . . has reached a settlement with [Uber], quickly ending a potential legal battle over the first 
pedestrian fatality caused by an autonomous vehicle.”). 
 21. Out of scope for this Comment are criminal law, insurance law, as well as defenses and 
privileges in tort law.  See, e.g., Uber Not Criminally Liable After Self-Driving Car Killed Woman: 
Local Prosecutor, ADVISEN FRONT PAGE NEWS (Mar. 7, 2019), http://www.advisen.com/ 
tools/fpnproc/fpns/articles_new_1/P/333123335.html?rid=333123335&list_id=1 (“Uber will not 
be held criminally liable for a crash last year in which one of its self-driving cars struck and killed 
a pedestrian in Tempe, Arizona—the first accident of its kind.”). 
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I.  BACK TO BASICS: TRADITIONAL TORTS 
Since Old Testament times, people have had certain obligations to each other, 
especially the duty to not kill each other.22  In 1942, Isaac Asimov—the famed 
science fiction author—extended this principle to machines in the Three Laws 
of Robotics: 
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a 
human being to come to harm. 
2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except 
where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection 
does not conflict with the First or Second Law.23 
Today, civil disputes involving responsibility and compensation for an injury or 
death are resolved primarily through tort law.24  In the United States, tort law 
has been created by the states’ statutes and common law.25  For this reason, this 
Comment will explore the best examples of case law without being limited to a 
single jurisdiction and with the understanding that tort law varies from state to 
state.  This Comment will often cite to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, which are drafted by the American Law Institute 
(ALI) and “widely relied upon and often cited by the courts,” to offer a more 
holistic approach based on the consensus of tort law experts.26  Although “new 
cases may be cloaked in unfamiliar facts with the advent of artificial intelligence, 
old case law is applicable to give a good idea of how courts will respond to these 
new problems.”27  As Charles Williams said, “I think in order to move forward 
into the future, you need to know where you’ve been.”28 
                                                 
 22. See Exodus 20:13 (King James) (“Thou shalt not kill.”). 
 23. Do We Need Asimov’s Laws?, MIT TECH. REV. (May 16, 2014), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/527336/do-we-need-asimovs-laws/ (“Asimov’s laws of 
robotics have become a key part of a science fiction culture that has . . . become mainstream.”). 
 24. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID E. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE, 
AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 13th ed. 2015). 
A tort is a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the law provides a 
remedy.  This area of law imposes duties on persons to act in a manner that will not injure 
other persons.  A person who breaches a tort duty has committed a tort and may be liable 
to pay damages in a lawsuit brought by a person injured because of that tort. 
Id. 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Society may 
regard a particular desire as improper and may, therefore, by common law or by statute impose . . . 
civil liability upon an effort to satisfy the desire by realizing its object.”). 
 26. Restatement of the Law Second, Torts, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/publications/ 
show/torts/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 27. Weston Kowert, The Foreseeability of Human-Artificial Intelligence Interactions, 
96 TEX. L. REV. 181, 184 (2017). 
 28. Charles Williams, Charles Williams Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, 
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/charles_williams_385539 (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).  
Charles Williams was a twentieth century “poet, novelist, and lay theologian,” and a cohort of C.S. 
346 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69.2:1 
A.  Intentional Tort: Battery 
Intentional torts committed by AI, especially those that go directly against 
Asimov’s Second Law of Robotics and follow a human’s orders to “injure a 
human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm[,]”29 
would likely be adequately covered by existing tort law.  The AI machine would 
merely become a human’s instrument for the intentional tort.  Although there 
are several intentional torts, this Comment will only explore battery, as this tort 
is most related to the experience of a pedestrian being struck by a car.  Section 
13 of Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that: 
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if 
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact 
with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent 
apprehension of such a contact, and 
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or 
indirectly results.30 
All intentional torts, including battery, require the claimant to demonstrate 
“intent” in order to recover.31  Negligent or reckless behavior is insufficient to 
establish intent.32  Finding specific intent to injure or “bring about any 
unauthorized or offensive contact”33 is unnecessary, but only whether the human 
“knew with substantial certainty”34 that an action could  either injure a person or 
produce a harmful or offensive contact.  The human simply “must have been 
capable of entertaining that same intent and must have entertained it in fact.”35  
In the context of autonomous vehicles, the intent of both the AI-Chaperone and 
computer programmer will be explored in Part II. 
                                                 
Lewis and J. R. R. Tolkien.  Welcome!, THE CHARLES WILLIAMS SOC’Y, 
http://www.charleswilliamssociety.org.uk/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019). 
 29. Do We Need Asimov’s Laws?, supra note 23. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 31. See id. § 16. 
If an act is done with the intention of inflicting upon another an offensive but not a 
harmful bodily contact, or of putting another in apprehension of either a harmful or 
offensive bodily contact, and such act causes a bodily contact to the other, the actor is 
liable to the other for a battery although the act was not done with the intention of 
bringing about the resulting bodily harm. 
Id. 
 32. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 60 (1998) (quoting Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re 
Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997)) (Negligent or reckless conduct does not produce “‘what 
the law has for generations called an intentional tort.’”). 
 33. Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Wash. 1955). 
 34. Id. at 1095 (applying Washington law) (finding that a child could form intent for battery 
if “deliberately” pulling a chair from under an elderly woman). 
 35. McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Mass. 1937) (“[W]here an insane person by his act 
does intentional damage to the person or property of another he is liable for that damage in the same 
circumstances in which a normal person would be liable.”). 
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B.  Negligence 
Most litigation surrounding car accidents revolves around a driver’s alleged 
negligence.36  Section 282 of Restatement (Second) of Torts states that 
“negligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the 
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.  It does not include 
conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others.”37  Thus, negligence 
does not require an intent element.38  Instead, a cause of action for negligence 
needs a duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damage or actual loss.39 
This Comment will focus on the element of causation, which produces tort 
liability when both actual cause and proximate cause are met.  Actual cause is 
“when the harm would not have occurred absent that action.”40  Proximate cause 
is “limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct 
tortious.”41 
1.  Automatic Elevators 
Although commonplace now, automatic elevators were not embraced by the 
American public in the early twentieth century—the automatic elevator “was the 
Google car of its era.  And people hated it.”42  At that time, people preferred 
riding in elevators with a human operator.43  As automatic elevators came into 
the foreground, so did the negligence lawsuits that followed.44 
In its 1931 decision Lyon v. Queensboro Corporation,45 the Supreme Court 
of New York, Appellate Division, found “[w]here the defendant operates an 
automatic elevator in an apartment house for the use of its tenants, it is under the 
                                                 
 36. Ken LaMance, What Is Negligence in a Car Accident Lawsuit?, LEGALMATCH, 
https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/negligence-in-a-car-accident-lawsuit.html (last 
modified June 7, 2018, 1:38 AM) (“Most car accident lawsuits are based on negligence, because 
negligence does not involve intentional acts by the defendant.”). 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 38. See id. 
 39. See SCHWARTZ, KELLY & PARTLETT, supra note 24, at 140. 
 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).  Actual cause can be found under Section 27, “[i]f multiple acts occur, 
each of which under § 26 alone would have been a factual cause of the physical harm at the same 
time in the absence of the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”  Id. § 27. 
 41. Id. § 29. 
 42. See Remembering When Driverless Elevators Drew Skepticism, NPR (July 31, 2015, 
5:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/07/31/427990392/remembering-when-driverless-elevators-
drew-skepticism (“The automatic elevator was invented around 1900, but it took more than [fifty] 
years before the public became comfortable and automatic elevators became ubiquitous.”). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. (“But every new automatic device that enters our lives, from automatic doors to 
escalators, has had to face this awkward moment where people are skeptical and maybe scared.”).  
See also Digelormo v. Weil, 183 N.E. 360, 361 (N.Y. 1932); Lyon v. Queensboro Corp., 248 N.Y.S. 
353, 353 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931). 
 45. 248 N.Y.S. 353 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931). 
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duty of using reasonable care in the construction and maintenance of the elevator 
doors, gates and shaft.”46  A year later in 1932, the New York Court of Appeals 
in Digelormo v. Weil47 found that if there are multiple “causes of injury, for one 
or more of which defendant is not responsible,” the plaintiff’s recovery on a 
negligence claim depends on showing that the defendant was responsible fully 
or partially for one of the causes.48  In Digelormo, the apartment house’s owner 
and the automatic elevator’s constructor were sued when a young child died, as 
“his head and body were crushed between the elevator and the floor of the 
building.”49  The New York Court of Appeals found the elevator company could 
not “be charged with any negligence in creating this space or in permitting it to 
exist.”50  Moreover, the plaintiff failed to prove that the owner of the apartment 
house was liable, since “[t]he cause of the accident [was] extremely vague and 
uncertain[.]”51 
2.  Pilot’s Failure to Use Autopilot System 
Although autopilot systems are not without some inherent risks, their use is 
standard practice in aviation today.52  In Klein v. United States,53 the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland, applying Maryland law, found 
that autopilot should have been engaged as it was “common practice and 
procedure” for the commercial aircraft’s approach and that the negligent pilot’s 
                                                 
 46. Id. at 353 (finding that “questions of defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence were [questions] of fact for the jury” to decide). 
 47. 183 N.E. 360 (N.Y. 1932). 
 48. Id. at 363. 
 49. Id. at 361–62.  The accident involved an 
electric push-button passenger elevator built and constructed by the defendant . . . the 
shaft in which it ran and the doors and space leading to the elevator were the work of the 
architect and builder.  The measurements of the shafts were taken wholly from the 
architect’s plan.  The elevator equipment included rails, car, motor, machinery and safety 
interlocks, excluding safety doors, saddles, jambs, etc. 
Id. at 361. 
 50. Id. (“The general contractor, not the elevator company, constructed the space between the 
shaftway door and the elevator gate.”). 
 51. Id. (“[T]he plaintiff . . . failed to show how [the death] happened or that anybody’s 
negligence [was] responsible for it.”). 
 52. See Jeff Wise, The Boeing 737 Max and the Problems Autopilot Can’t Solve, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/opinion/business-economics/boeing-737-
max.html. 
Automation is not without its own hazards, though.  As it has become ubiquitous in 
cockpits, automation-related accidents have come to make up a significant proportion of 
all air disasters.  In 2013, the Federal Aviation Administration published a study of 
accidents over the previous two decades and found that reports of “unexpected or 
unexplained” behavior of automated systems were present in [forty-six] percent of the 
accident reports and [sixty] percent of the major incident reports collected by the 
researchers. 
Id. 
 53. 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15348 (D. Md. Nov. 11, 1975). 
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operation was “inconsistent with the approved instrument approach 
procedure[.]”54  The court held that the pilot’s negligence55 was the “sole 
proximate cause of the crash” and “the pilot’s . . . misapprehension taken 
together with the pilot’s failure to utilize his autopilot and the pilot’s operation 
of his aircraft below the glide slope corridor, caused the wake turbulence 
encounter which itself was the final cause of the accident.”56  Consequently, the 
pilot’s inaction amounted to professional malpractice for failure to meet the 
standard of care. 
3.  Distracted Driving While Using a Smart Phone 
Although the invention of the smart phone has increasingly made life easier 
in many ways, one externality is “distracted driving” due to talking and text 
messaging.57  In Meador v. Apple, Inc.,58 the plaintiff sued Apple under both 
negligence and strict products liability, and “alleged that the accident was caused 
by Apple’s failure to implement the patent on the iPhone 5 and by Apple’s 
failure to warn iPhone 5 users about the risks of distracted driving.”59  Here, the 
Fifth Circuit applied Texas law and affirmed that “a driver’s neurobiological 
response to a smartphone notification” was not “a cause in fact of a car crash” 
since that “would entail an impermissible innovation or extension of state 
law[.]”60  In 2013, a distracted driver looked down to read “a text message on 
her iPhone 5” and returned her attention “too late to avoid colliding with a 
vehicle carrying two adults and a child.  The adults died, while the child survived 
but was rendered paraplegic.”61  The court noted that “cause in fact and 
foreseeability” are required to find proximate cause, which must be a 
“substantial factor.”62  Ultimately, the court declined to “say that Texas law 
would regard a smartphone’s effect on a user as a substantial factor in the user’s 
                                                 
 54. Id. at *3, *16–17 (applying Maryland law). 
 55. Id. at *13 (The pilot’s negligence stemmed from his “fail[ure] to operate his aircraft in a 
safe manner consistent with good operating practices and procedures.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Distracted Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/ 
risky-driving/distracted-driving (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
Distracted driving is any activity that diverts attention from driving, including talking or 
texting on your phone . . . .  Texting is the most alarming distraction.  Sending or reading 
a text takes your eyes off the road for [five] seconds.  At [fifty-five] mph, that’s like 
driving the length of an entire football field with your eyes closed. 
Id. 
 58. 911 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 59. Id. at 263. 
 60. Id.  The court concluded, “[b]ecause we decline to consider ‘neurobiological compulsion’ 
a substantial factor under Texas law, we conclude that the iPhone 5 could not be a cause in fact of 
the injuries in this case.”  Id. at 267. 
 61. Id. at 263. 
 62. Id. at 264 (quoting Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995)) 
(“Cause in fact means that the defendant’s act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about 
the injury which would not otherwise have occurred.”). 
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tortious acts.  To say otherwise would be an innovation of state law that Erie 
does not permit [the court] to make.”63 
In Modisette v. Apple, Inc.,64 a driver on the highway used “the FaceTime 
application on his Apple iPhone 6 Plus” and crashed into a stationary car causing 
“severe physical and emotional injuries” to a couple and killing their five-year-
old daughter.65  The Court of Appeals of California held that the injured couple 
could not “establish that Apple’s design of the iPhone constituted a proximate 
cause of the injuries they suffered, a necessary element of their remaining 
claims.”66  The court barred a proximate cause finding because of a “tenuous 
connection between the [family’s] injuries and Apple’s design of the iPhone 6 
Plus without lockout technology and . . . the burden to Apple and corresponding 
consequences to the community that would flow from such a duty.”67 
4.  Res Ipsa Loquitur for Car Accidents 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows a plaintiff to get past a directed verdict 
and to the jury even though the plaintiff has not proved any specific act of 
negligence.68  The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that res ipsa loquitur 
applies under the following conditions: 
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by 
negligence of the defendant when 
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in 
the absence of negligence; 
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the 
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the 
evidence; and 
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the 
defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.69 
Additionally, the court “determine[s] whether the inference may reasonably be 
drawn by the jury, or whether it must necessarily be drawn[,]” while the jury 
“determine[s] whether the inference is to be drawn in any case where different 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 267.  In terms of liability, it neither mattered that Apple “secured a patent” for 
locking handheld computing devices while a user was driving in 2008, nor that “Apple did not 
implement any version of a ‘lock-out mechanism’ on the iPhone 5.”  Id. at 263. 
 64. 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
 65. Id. at 213. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 215.  The court found “that the gap between Apple’s design of the iPhone and the 
[family’s] injuries [was] too great for the tort system to hold Apple responsible.”  Id. at 226. 
 68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“A res 
ipsa loquitur case is ordinarily merely one kind of case of circumstantial evidence, in which the 
jury may reasonably infer both negligence and causation from the mere occurrence of the event and 
the defendant’s relation to it.”).  In Latin, res ipsa loquitur means “the thing speaks for itself[.]”  
Id. § 328D cmt. a. 
 69. Id. § 328D(1)(a)–(c). 
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conclusions may reasonably be reached.”70  Res ipsa loquitur can be applied 
against a driver who crashes into a stationary object as, “[i]n the ordinary 
experience of mankind[,] a moving vehicle does not without negligence of those 
responsible for it come into collision with a stationary object of the size of an 
excavator.”71  But res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied when two cars collide with 
each other.72  This is also true for a collision involving a driver of a vehicle who 
injures “a passenger or a bystander on the sidewalk” and who would not have a 
res ipsa loquitur claim against the driver.73  Under the res ipsa loquitur principle, 
circumstantial evidence permits the jury to infer negligence, e.g., “when a driver 
runs down a visible pedestrian, that he has failed to keep a proper lookout.”74 
C.  Products Liability 
Both negligence and products liability claims “require proof of causation.”75  
Thus, if causation is not met under negligence, then it similarly would fail under 
products liability.76  A cause of action for products liability arises when “[o]ne 
engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells 
or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or 
property caused by the defect.”77  In most jurisdictions, strict liability is available 
in cases involving injury for the use of products.78  More specifically, strict 
liability may attach “even if the manufacturer’s quality control in producing the 
defective product was reasonable.  A plaintiff was not required to be in direct 
privity with the defendant seller to bring an action.”79  Furthermore, the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability provides that 
[t]he concept of strict liability, which focuses on the product rather 
than the conduct of the manufacturer, may help make the point that a 
defendant is held to the expert standard of knowledge available to the 
relevant manufacturing community at the time the product was 
                                                 
 70. Id. § 328D(2)–(3) (emphasis added). 
 71. Bryne v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 168 N.E. 540, 540 (Mass. 1929). 
 72. Hugh R. O’Connell, Torts–Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Automobiles, 35 MARQ. 
L. REV. 36, 37 (1951) (“The possible causative factors involved in a collision between two moving 
vehicles are so numerous that it is virtually impossible to show the defendant’s exclusive control 
over the factors producing the accident necessary to the application of res ipsa loquitur.”). 
 73. SCHWARTZ, KELLY & PARTLETT, supra note 24, at 264. 
 74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. b. 
 75. Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 76. See id. 
 77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).  
“‘[S]trict products liability’ is a term of art that reflects the judgment that products liability is a 
discrete area of tort law which borrows from both negligence and warranty.  It is not fully congruent 
with classical tort or contract law.”  Id. cmt. a. 
 78. See id. § 1 (“In the early 1960s, American courts began to recognize that a commercial 
seller of any product having a manufacturing defect should be liable in tort for harm caused by the 
defect regardless of the plaintiff’s ability to maintain a traditional negligence or warranty action.”). 
 79. Id. 
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manufactured.  Finally, the liability of nonmanufacturing sellers in the 
distributive chain [also] is strict [in most, but not all, jurisdictions].  It 
is no defense that they acted reasonably and did not discover a defect 
in the product, be it from manufacturing, design, or failure to warn.80 
In Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons,81 the Ninth Circuit, applying California law, 
hinted that “highly technical tools[,]” including “[c]omputer software that fails 
to yield the result for which it was designed,” potentially could be “‘products’ 
for the purpose of products liability law.”82  And in Ferguson v. Bombardier 
Services Corporation,83 the Eleventh Circuit, applying applicable state law, held 
that a military aircraft manufacturer that installed an autopilot system solely was 
liable for a manufacturing defect.84  On the other hand, the manufacturer of the 
autopilot system was not liable for “the crash of a military aircraft . . . [that was] 
transporting Virginia Air National Guard personnel from Florida to Virginia, 
killing eighteen passengers and three crew members.”85  Even if the autopilot 
system manufacturer “shipped an improperly assembled” autopilot system to the 
military aircraft manufacturer who then “installed the autopilot system using the 
same configuration[,]” the autopilot system manufacturer would not be liable.86  
The court held that liability for the manufacturing defect stemmed from whoever 
“assembled the autopilot system” on the aircraft.87 
D.  Vicarious Liability 
Virtually trans-substantive across all legal areas, vicarious liability “hold[s] 
one individual accountable for the actions of another.”88  Although not a tort in 
and of itself, vicarious liability is important to consider because, if applied, a 
person can be responsible for the tortious actions of another.  Generally, one 
does not face vicarious liability for the actions of another, unless falling under 
                                                 
 80. Id.  But see SCHWARTZ, KELLY & PARTLETT, supra note 24, at 661 (“About [twenty-four] 
states have [innocent seller immunity] statutes that allow a nonmanufacturer seller to be dismissed 
from a products liability lawsuit if the seller identifies the product manufacturer, the manufacturer 
is subject to the court’s jurisdiction, and the manufacturer is able to satisfy any judgment.”). 
 81. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 82. Id. at 1034 n.1, 1035–36 (applying California law). 
 83. 244 F. App’x 944 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 84. Id. at 951 (applying applicable state law). 
 85. Id. at 947. 
 86. Id. at 951. 
The critical issue in the case is the precise cause of the accident.  The [decedents’ estates] 
allege[d] that two design defects and a manufacturing defect, all in the autopilot system, 
conspired to cause the aircraft to crash following the gust of wind . . . .  The 
[manufacturers] argue[d] the aircraft was improperly loaded, such that the center of 
gravity was beyond the limit allowed for the safe operation of the aircraft. 
Id. at 947.  Turbulence was ruled out as a “primary cause” by both parties.  Id. 
 87. Id. at 951–52. 
 88. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984). 
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an exception.89  When applicable, vicarious liability holds “the employer liable 
for the negligence [or other fault] of the independent contractor, irrespective of 
whether the employer has himself been at fault.”90  This liability is based on 
policy decisions disallowing the employer “to shift the responsibility for the 
proper conduct of the work to the contractor.”91 
One exception to the general rule of no vicarious liability is nondelegable 
duties, in which an owner or employer’s obligations cannot be passed onto an 
independent contractor.92  Nondelegable duties are neither a “substitute for 
liability based on negligence[]” nor strict liability, “but [rather] to assure that 
when a negligently caused harm occurs, the injured party will be compensated 
by the person whose activity caused the harm and who may therefore properly 
be held liable for the negligence of his agent, whether his agent was an employee 
or an independent contractor.”93 
In Maloney v. Rath,94 the Supreme Court of California held that a car accident 
was caused by an owner’s failure to maintain her “brakes that resulted from her 
independent contractor’s negligence in overhauling or in thereafter inspecting 
the brakes.”95  Both the mechanic and the owner had a duty: 
The responsibility for minimizing that risk or compensating for the 
failure to do so properly rests with the person who owns and operates 
the vehicle.  [She] is the party primarily to be benefited by its use; 
[s]he selects the contractor and is free to insist upon one who is 
financially responsible and to demand indemnity from [her]; the cost 
of [her] liability insurance that distributes the risk is properly 
attributable to [her] activities; and the discharge of the duty to exercise 
reasonable care in the maintenance of [her] vehicle is of the utmost 
importance to the public.96 
On the other hand, in Dubret v. Holland America Line Westours, Inc.,97 the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, applying 
Washington law, held that a cruise company was not liable on a theory of 
                                                 
 89. For example, states have automobile consent “statutes that make the owner of an 
automobile vicariously liable for injury caused by the negligent operation of the vehicle as long as 
it is being used with the owner’s consent.”  SCHWARTZ, KELLY & PARTLETT, supra note 24, at 
726. 
 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch.15, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. (“Such a ‘non-delegable duty’ requires the person upon whom it is imposed to 
answer for it that care is exercised by anyone, even though he be an independent contractor, to 
whom the performance of the duty is entrusted.”). 
 93. Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1968). 
 94. 445 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1968). 
 95. Id. at 516–17 (“Since her duty to maintain her brakes in compliance with the provisions 
of the Vehicle Code is nondelegable, the fact that the brake failure was the result of her independent 
contractor’s negligence is no defense.”). 
 96. Id. at 516. 
 97. 25 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (W.D. Wash. 1998). 
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respondeat superior for the actions of an independent contractor bus company 
that “transported [passengers] . . . to the airport . . . [when] their bus collided 
with a garbage truck and they were injured.”98  The cruise company avoided 
liability since “[b]oth the brochure advertising the Panama cruise and the 
contract governing the cruise state plainly that on-shore services, including bus 
transportation, would be provided by independent contractors, and that [the 
cruise company] would assume no liability for the negligence of these 
providers.”99  Ultimately, it did not matter that one “chaperone [allegedly] 
noticed that the driver was being reckless, but, instead of acting to correct the 
situation, moved to the back of the bus where he was less likely to be injured.”100 
II.  SEARCHING FOR THE ANSWER: AI REMAINING AN OPEN QUESTION IN TORT 
LIABILITY 
In February 2016, Ben Guarino, a science journalist at Inverse,101 noted that 
autonomous vehicles “may very well be much safer than human drivers.  They 
will still kill someone because machines, like humans, are fallible.”102  Two 
years later, his prediction came true when an autonomous Uber SUV struck a 
woman dead.103  This led to legal scholars examining the risks and rewards of 
AI through the example of the self-driving car.104  For example, Above the Law, 
a legal news website, published the following hypothetical in a survey: 
A passenger hires a self-driving car, through a service like Uber or 
Lyft, that is programmed by artificial intelligence, from a company 
like IBM or Google.  Because of bad weather,105 this autonomous 
                                                 
 98. Id. at 1152–53 (“The [passengers] claim that the chaperones identified themselves as 
‘representatives’ of [the cruise company] amounts to an allegation of apparent agency, as opposed 
to true employment.”). 
 99. Id. at 1153 (“Such disclaimers are enforceable, and have been found to serve as a legal 
bar to claims of apparent agency in cases with facts analogous to this one.”). 
 100. Id. (“The [passengers] admit that the chaperones, when questioned after the accident, 
identified themselves as [tour company] employees, not employees of [the cruise company].”). 
 101. Since August 2015, the online website Inverse has taken “a scientific approach to 
analyzing culture and a cultural approach to talking about science.”  Hannah Margaret Allen, The 
Genesis of Inverse, INVERSE (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.inverse.com/article/5640-the-genesis-
of-inverse. 
 102. Ben Guarino, Google Claims Some Responsibility for Its Driverless Car Crashing, 
INVERSE (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.inverse.com/article/12181-google-claims-some-
responsibility-for-its-driverless-car-crashing (“The Lexus busted a fender and a sensor.  No one 
was hurt.  But don’t expect that to last.”). 
 103. See Krisher, supra note 18. 
 104. David Lat, The Ethical Implications of Artificial Intelligence, ABOVE THE L., 
https://abovethelaw.com/law2020/the-ethical-implications-of-artificial-intelligence/ (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2019) (“Perhaps the most widely discussed example of balancing the risks and rewards 
of artificial intelligence is the self-driving car.”). 
 105. For the purposes of this question in order to hold a party liable for the accident, it is 
presumed that the “bad weather” described does not amount to an “act of God.”  See, e.g., Golden 
v. Amory, 109 N.E.2d 131, 133 (Mass. 1952) (emphasis added) (The defendants were not “liable 
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vehicle injures a pedestrian.  As a very general matter, who should 
bear the losses from this accident, and in what rough percentages?106 
Unfortunately, the Above the Law survey does not expand upon the legal theories 
and provide any analysis, but this Comment will accept the challenge. 
A.  Part Deux: Intentional Torts: Battery 
Under Section 13 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, an AI-powered 
autonomous vehicle involved in a traffic accident certainly would produce a 
“harmful contact” to any respective parties (e.g., passengers of affected 
autonomous vehicles, pedestrian, and human driver of another car (if not fully 
autonomous)).107  Here, the battery element in dispute would be intent.  A few 
issues immediately arise when attempting to apply the intentional tort of battery 
to the context of autonomous vehicles.  Without question, a pedestrian who is 
injured by an autonomous vehicle would experience harmful contact.108  
However, two questions remain: who is the actor subject to liability, and what is 
the actor’s intent? 
Likely, a court would need to examine either the intent of the AI-Chaperone109 
(e.g., the company who sold or manufactured the autonomous vehicle, or 
possibly the person who now owns it) or computer programmer, with the AI-
powered autonomous vehicle acting as the instrument of the battery.  Even after 
figuring out who the actor is, simply getting into an autonomous vehicle to go 
from points A to B without more is unlikely to merit the intent that rises to a 
battery cause of action. 
As David Lat notes, “programming an autonomous vehicle involves difficult 
choices that will generate extensive ethical and legal debate in the years ahead.  
In fact, these debates are already taking place, in the legislatures of the [forty]-
plus states that have passed, or have considered passing, laws to govern self-
driving cars.”110  But if the computer programmer followed Isaac Asimov’s 
Three Laws of Robotics in creating the AI algorithm, then there could be no 
“intent.”111  Rather, the autonomous vehicle would be designed to protect human 
life.  Similarly, this would be true for the seller or manufacturer of the 
                                                 
for injury caused by the flood waters” as it “was plainly beyond the capacity of any one to 
anticipate, and was clearly an act of God.”). 
 106. Who is Responsible When a Self-Driving Car Crashes?, ABOVE THE L., 
https://abovethelaw.com/law2020/the-ethical-implications-of-artificial-intelligence/poll-liability-
in-self-driving-cars/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).  Nearly eighty percent of survey participants found 
both the pedestrian and passenger who hired the car at zero percent liability, and the majority of 
participants find some percentage of liability for the car manufacturer, car service, and car 
programmer.  See id. 
 107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 108. See id. § 15 (“Bodily harm is any physical impairment of the condition of another’s body, 
or physical pain or illness.”). 
 109. See infra Part III. 
 110. Lat, supra note 104. 
 111. Do We Need Asimov’s Laws?, supra note 23. 
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autonomous vehicle, and ultimately for the owner of the vehicle.  The only issue 
would be whether the algorithm protects the passenger over the pedestrian. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that intent need not require actual 
harmful bodily contact, and 
[i]f an act is done with the intention of inflicting upon another an 
offensive but not a harmful bodily contact . . . and such act causes a 
bodily contact to the other, the actor is liable to the other for a battery 
although the act was not done with the intention of bringing about the 
resulting bodily harm.112 
In Garratt v. Dailey,113 regardless of his young age, a boy’s intent could be 
found if he “knew with substantial certainty” that his actions could hurt another 
without actual intent to do so.114  In McGuire v. Almy,115 a mentally ill patient 
would not be treated any differently for liability purposes when hitting a nurse, 
if “capable of entertaining” intent and having “entertained it in fact.”116  At this 
time, it seems unlikely that a plaintiff could produce sufficient evidence to 
persuade the fact-finder that a computer programmer of an autonomous vehicle’s 
AI software “knew with substantial certainty”117 or had “entertained [the intent 
to injure the pedestrian] in fact” when there is machine learning.118 
“Machine learning departs from software coding in the conventional sense 
and begins to look more like coaching than it does programming[,]”119 as the AI 
software eventually makes independent decisions.  Consequently, determining 
the intent of a human becomes more abstract as machine learning allows an 
autonomous vehicle to “‘learn’ to classify and respond to situations based on 
datasets of images and behaviors.  The software is shown thousands of images 
of a cyclist, or a skateboarder, or an ambulance, until it learns to identify those 
things on its own.”120  Although initially a computer programmer provides 
stimuli to the system, machine learning allows for evolution based on the 
software’s exposure to the outside world and determination of “which of its 
actions create the most successful results.  It then incorporates its most 
successful actions into future behavior.”121 
                                                 
 112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16(1).  Intent cannot be formed by software, but 
only by a human being, such as a computer programmer or the car manufacturer using the computer 
software.  See id. 
 113. 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955). 
 114. Id. at 1095. 
 115. 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1937). 
 116. Id. at 763. 
 117. Garratt, 279 P.2d at 1095. 
 118. Almy, 8 N.E.2d at 763. 
 119. Kowert, supra note 27, at 183. 
 120. Marshall & Davies, supra note 19. 
 121. Kowert, supra note 27, at 183 (“Many forms of artificial intelligence, including 
autonomous vehicles, employ machine learning.”); Lat, supra note 104 (“Machine learning is based 
on algorithms that can learn from data without relying on rules-based programming.”). 
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Since 2014, MIT Media Lab has run an experiment called “Moral Machine” 
that “crowdsource[s] people’s decisions on how self-driving cars should 
prioritize lives in different variations of the ‘trolley problem.’”122  In an 
emergency, autonomous vehicles might be programmed to choose between 
moving in a direction that would either “kill three elderly pedestrians” or “kill 
three youthful passengers.”123  Moreover, “consumers would more readily enter 
a car that protected themselves over pedestrians.”124 
Additionally, a 2019 Georgia Tech study125 found that an autonomous vehicle 
is five percent worse at detecting pedestrians with darker skin tones than those 
with lighter skin tones.126  This study indicates that “algorithmic bias”127 may 
occur for two reasons: “First, the object-detection models had mostly been 
trained on examples of light-skinned pedestrians.  Second, the models didn’t 
place enough weight on learning from the few examples of dark-skinned people 
that they did have.”128  Simply uploading people’s age and racial preferences 
into a machine will likely not suffice as intent if done unconsciously.  Even 
though algorithms are programmed by humans, there may be no “substantial 
certainty” because the AI software potentially can be overcome by the machine 
learning software itself.  Because even a five percent difference between life and 
death based on skin color is unacceptable, the onus is on the corporations and 
their computer programmers to counteract any algorithmic bias. 
A company using this technology should consider best practices, such as 
having a more representative dataset testing sample, a more diverse group of 
programmers, and mandatory fairness testing that checks for different biases.129  
Such methods are beginning to gain support amongst the AI community in light 
of the unjustifiable deaths of countless African Americans, including the recent 
                                                 
 122. Karen Hao, Should a Self-Driving Car Kill the Baby or the Grandma? Depends on Where 
You’re From, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612341/a-
global-ethics-study-aims-to-help-ai-solve-the-self-driving-trolley-problem/. 
The classic trolley problem goes like this: You see a runaway trolley speeding down the 
tracks, about to hit and kill five people.  You have access to a lever that could switch the 
trolley to a different track, where a different person would meet an untimely demise.  
Should you pull the lever and end one life to spare five? 
Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (“The study has interesting implications for countries currently testing self-driving 
cars, since these preferences could play a role in shaping the design and regulation of such 
vehicles.”). 
 125. BENJAMIN WILSON ET AL., PREDICTIVE INEQUITY IN OBJECT DETECTION 1 n.1, 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.11097.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 126. Sigal Samuel, A New Study Finds a Potential Risk with Self-Driving Cars: Failure to 
Detect Dark-Skinned Pedestrians, VOX (Mar. 6, 2019, 10:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-
perfect/2019/3/5/18251924/self-driving-car-racial-bias-study-autonomous-vehicle-dark-skin. 
 127. Id. (Algorithmic bias is “how human bias seeps into our automated decision-making 
systems.”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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deaths of George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, and Breonna Taylor130 that have 
ignited a worldwide movement131 towards anti-racism.132  The AI community 
recognizes its lack of diversity as a facial problem that “risks replicating or 
perpetuating historical biases and power imbalances[.]”133  For example, in June 
2020, Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft froze sales of “facial recognition tech” to 
law enforcement that AI experts and civil rights organizations claim 
“disproportionately affects people of color[.]”134  More specifically, AI facial 
recognition software may be abused “like any policing tool operating by 
systemically racist societies or institutions . . . to target people of color more 
often.”135  The crux of the problem lies in “the datasets used to train facial 
recognition algorithms [that] are often predominantly made up of pictures of 
white men.”136  Because machine learning is not infallible, these datasets “used 
to build facial recognition software ingrain[] it with racial bias which makes it 
more likely to misidentify women and people of color, which would in turn lead 
to more wrongful arrests.”137  From this cautionary tale, carmakers and tech 
companies developing autonomous vehicles should use diverse datasets to avoid 
the future fact-finder from concluding that they knew with substantial certainty 
that a person of color was more likely to be injured or the machine learning 
software entertained such harm. 
B.  Part Deux: Negligence 
With negligence, the element that fails on autonomous vehicles is causation.  
Legal scholars have noted that the novel phenomenon of unrestricted, computer-
directed movement “is likely to challenge certain basic assumptions embedded 
in our existing legal structure.  For instance, tort law (and other areas of law 
concerned with accidental harm) operates within an overall framework that 
implicitly presumes that the movements of others will be broadly 
                                                 
 130. See Kyle Wiggers, The AI Community Says Black Lives Matter, but More Work Needs to 
be Done, VENTUREBEAT (June 5, 2020, 1:28 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2020/06/05/diversity-
in-ai-black-lives-matter/. 
 131. See Gregory Warner, The Global Legacy of George Floyd, NPR: ROUGH TRANSLATION 
(June 10, 2020, 1:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/874270664/the-global-legacy-of-
george-floyd. 
 132. See Being Antiracist, SMITHSONIAN INST., https://nmaahc.si.edu/learn/talking-about-
race/topics/being-antiracist (last visited June 16, 2020) (“To create an equal society, we must 
commit to making unbiased choices and being antiracist in all aspects of our lives.”). 
 133. See Wiggers, supra note 130. 
 134. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Outrage Over Police Brutality has Finally Convinced Amazon, 
Microsoft, and IBM to Rule Out Selling Facial Recognition Tech to Law Enforcement. Here’s 
What’s Going On., BUS. INSIDER (June 13, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
amazon-microsoft-ibm-halt-selling-facial-recognition-to-police-2020-6. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (emphasis added). 
 137. Id. 
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predictable.”138  No matter how many algorithms can be performed through 
machine learning, at a human level, an autonomous vehicle will be 
unpredictable.139 
On February 14, 2016, Google’s autonomous vehicle “stopped in the right 
lane and [] attempt[ed] to get around sandbags surrounding a storm drain 
blocking its path.  The bus driver, operating in the middle lane, thought the Lexus 
would stay put, while Google’s program thought the bus would slow down, 
leading to false assumptions on both parties[,]” and a low-speed crash.140  
Google, in a February 2016 monthly report, wrote this off as “a classic example 
of the negotiation that’s a normal part of driving . . . [in] trying to predict each 
other’s movements.”141  In other words, an autonomous vehicle makes similar 
assessments as a human driver.  Because autonomous vehicles cannot use body 
language, “[s]tartup Drive.ai . . . uses LED signs that use text and pictures to 
communicate” with pedestrians.142 
Although Google bore “some responsibility, because if [its] car hadn’t moved 
there wouldn’t have been a collision[,]” Google also stated its “test driver 
believed the bus was going to slow or stop to allow [the car] to merge into the 
traffic, and that there would be sufficient space to do that.”143  Like the building 
owner who was responsible for the elevator in Lyon, Google’s autonomous 
vehicle should drive with “the duty of using reasonable care[.]”144  Like the 
“owner of an apartment house and the constructor of an elevator” in Digelormo, 
Google could even argue “[t]he cause of the accident [was] extremely vague and 
                                                 
 138. Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-
Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 130 (2016).  It should be considered that “[n]otions of 
predictability embedded in tort law may be challenged when activities are made by self-directed 
moving autonomous systems whose computer controlled actions may be difficult for ordinary 
people to anticipate.”  Id. at 164. 
 139. Id. at 145–46. 
 140. William Hoffman, Watch Google’s Self-Driving Lexus Crash Into a California Bus, 
INVERSE (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.inverse.com/article/12681-watch-google-s-self-driving-
lexus-crash-into-a-california-bus. 
 141. Alyssa Newcomb, Google’s Self-Driving Car Hits a Public Bus in California, ABC NEWS 
(Feb. 29, 2016, 2:57 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/googles-driving-car-hits-public-
bus-california/story?id=37288589; Scenes from the Streets, WAYMO (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://blog.waymo.com/2019/09/scenes-from-streets.html (republishing the original February 
2016 report). 
 142. Megan Rose Dickey, Here’s How Lyft Envisions Self-Driving Cars Communicating with 
Pedestrians, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 11, 2018, 3:49 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/11/lyft-
self-driving-car-communication-patent/ (“Drivers and pedestrians are accustomed to interacting in 
particular ways, removing a driver from some vehicles can lead to uncertainty and 
miscommunication.”).  Autonomous vehicles will provide their human counterparts some form of 
communication to alert their next plan of action, the same way human drivers use hand gestures or 
facial cues when driving.  See id. (Ford “want[s] everyone to trust self-driving vehicles—no matter 
if they are riders in these vehicles themselves or pedestrians, cyclists, scooter users or other drivers 
sharing the road.”). 
 143. Scenes from the Street, supra note 141. 
 144. Lyon v. Queensboro Corp., 248 N.Y.S. 353, 353 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931). 
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uncertain[.]”145  Unlike the pilot in Klein who failed to engage autopilot, 
Google’s driving operator did use autopilot.146  Unlike the applications used by 
the distracted drivers in both Meador and Modisette that did not lead to 
causation, Google’s autonomous vehicle took control, not its driving operator.  
Finally, with res ipsa loquitur, Google would have no issue here, as neither the 
bus driver nor Google’s driving operator could use it against the other.  For 
liability purposes under current tort law, negligence may capture the actions or 
inactions of the autonomous vehicle’s driving operator, but the AI software itself 
likely would need to fall under products liability. 
C.  Part Deux: Products Liability 
An autonomous vehicle is more than the sum of its parts, but if one of them 
causes the accident, there is a products liability question.  Significant 
components147 are: 
 
The laundry list of autonomous vehicle technology includes “radar, RaCam, 
Mobileye, vision-based systems (cameras and software), LIDAR, localization 
systems, intelligent software algorithms, a suite of advanced driver assistance 
systems, power electronics, battery systems, ADAS sensors, control platforms, 
high voltage wiring and connection systems, charge couplers, chip set platforms, 
robotics, and active safety products[.]”148 
                                                 
 145. Digelormo v. Weil, 183 N.E. 360, 361 (N.Y. 1932). 
 146. Klein v. United States, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15348, at *13 (D. Md. Nov. 11, 1975) 
(applying Maryland law). 
 147. Troy Griggs & Daisuke Wakabayashi, How a Self-Driving Uber Killed a Pedestrian in 
Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/20/us/self-
driving-uber-pedestrian-killed.html. 
 148. Delphi Auto. PLC v. Absmeier, No. 15-cv-13966, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38212, at *16–
17 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2016).  “Laser Imaging Detection and Ranging or ‘[LIDAR]’ is a 
technology that uses a pulse of light to measure distance.”  Quanergy Sys. v. Velodyne Lidar, Inc., 
No. 16-cv-05251-EJD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164916, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017). 
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For the March 2018 Uber accident mentioned above: 
The car’s radar and [LIDAR] sensors detected [the woman] about six 
seconds before the crash—first identifying her as an unknown object, 
then as a vehicle, and then as a bicycle, each time adjusting its 
expectations for her path of travel.  About a second before impact, the 
report says “the self-driving system determined that an emergency 
braking maneuver was needed to mitigate a collision.”149 
Uber disengaged “Volvo’s built-in automatic emergency braking system[.]”150  
Volvo would not be liable like the autopilot system manufacturer in Ferguson, 
because neither was the cause of its respective accident.151  Moreover, if a 
company, such as Google or Uber, only develops the autonomous vehicle’s 
software, then the “product” would be the software.  On the other hand, the 
“product” could encompass the whole car if the company developed everything, 
including the software. 
The “software that fails to yield the result for which it was designed” could 
lead to a products liability suit, but Uber’s software worked.152  Although 
currently humans outperform autonomous vehicles in discerning “continual 
judgments about other humans on the road[,]” the machine learning capabilities 
of AI will need further development.153 
D.  Part Deux: Vicarious Liability 
Less autonomous versions of self-driving technology already have been 
permitted legally in some jurisdictions (e.g., “Cadillac Super Cruise, Nissan 
ProPilot Assist, and Tesla Autopilot”) and “keep [the] car in [its] lane and a safe 
distance from other cars, allowing the [humans] behind the wheel to take their 
hands off the wheel . . . [provided they] keep paying attention to the road and 
remain ready to take control if needed.”154  One popular guide to self-driving 
cars noted that “these systems are not especially capable: They can’t see things 
                                                 
 149. Marshall & Davies, supra note 19 (“The report says that the Uber vehicle, a modified 
Volvo XC90 SUV, had been in autonomous mode for [nineteen] minutes and was driving at about 
[forty] mph when it hit [forty-nine]-year-old Elaine Herzberg as she was walking her bike across 
the street.”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Ferguson v. Bombardier Servs. Corp., 244 F. App’x 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying 
applicable state law). 
 152. Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying 
California law). 
 153. Adele Peters, Autonomous Cars Need to Think More Like Humans, Less Like Machines, 
FAST CO. (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90231475/perceptive-automata-helps-
self-driving-cars-think-like-humans (“About 250 milliseconds after seeing someone, you’ve made 
all of these inferences about their state of mind, their intention, their awareness . . . .  Those 
inferences are something that humans are incredibly good at, and self-driving cars to this point have 
had zero ability to do.”). 
 154. Alex Davies, The Wired Guide to Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Dec. 13, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/guide-self-driving-cars/. 
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like traffic lights or stopped firetrucks.  The problem is that humans are not 
especially well suited for serving as backups.”155 
Uber’s human operator is responsible for keeping an eye on the road and 
taking control when necessary.156  Uber disallows “its system to make 
emergency braking maneuvers on its own.  Rather than risk ‘erratic vehicle 
behavior’—like slamming on the brakes or swerving to avoid a plastic bag[.]”157  
In fact, Uber has fired drivers who viewed “their phones while on the job—and 
that shouldn’t surprise anybody.”158  Under vicarious liability, the employer 
assumes responsibility for any independent contractor.  For example, when 
Uber’s “backup ‘safety driver’ . . . was streaming the popular television show 
‘The Voice’ on her mobile phone in the moments before” the autonomous 
vehicle killed a pedestrian, Uber was liable for the backup safety driver’s 
negligent conduct because she was acting within the scope of her 
employment.159  Uber would have a nondelegable duty and be responsible for 
the negligent failure of its independent contractor, the backup safety driver.160 
III.  DISCOVERING A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: THE BEGINNING OF AI-
CHAPERONE LIABILITY 
The government, companies, and citizens are in the Wild West of both 
understanding the technology of autonomous vehicles and the legal structure 
around it.  We are in the midst of a “[twenty-first]-century gold rush . . . when 
many companies can ill afford to pause on autonomous technology given stiff 
competition from carmakers and other tech companies.”161  Research predicts 
that in the next few decades “driverless tech will add $7 trillion to the global 
economy and save hundreds of thousands of lives in the next few decades.”162  
Google’s Waymo was the first to begin testing.163  Other competitors followed, 
                                                 
 155. Id. (“At least two Tesla drivers in the [United States] have died using the system (one hit 
a truck in 2016, another hit a highway barrier this year), and the National Transportation Safety 
Board has criticized Tesla for making a system that’s too easy to abuse.”). 
 156. Marshall & Davies, supra note 19. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Mehr Nadeem & Emily McCormick, Uber Operator Was Watching ‘The Voice’ Before 
Self-Driving Crash, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2018, 1:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2018-06-22/uber-operator-was-watching-the-voice-before-self-driving-crash. 
 160. Under a jurisdiction with an automobile consent statute, Uber as the owner of the 
autonomous vehicle would remain at fault for any negligent behavior by a backup safety driver. 
 161. Davies, supra note 154; Isaac et al., supra note 18.  Waymo’s “pilot program with 
Walmart” assisting customers in picking up groceries “arrive[s] as leading technology companies 
and automakers, including GM and Tesla, are racing to develop the market for fully autonomous 
cars.”  Hamza Shaban, Waymo Partners with Walmart to Shuttle Customers in Self-Driving Cars, 
WASH. POST (July 25, 2018, 9:24 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/ 
2018/07/25/waymo-partners-with-walmart-shuttle-customers-self-driving-cars/. 
 162. Davies, supra note 154. 
 163. See generally Journey, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/journey/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) 
(explaining that Waymo has been working towards safety and consumer ease since the start); 
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including Uber,164 “[b]ut the crash in March [2018]—the first known fatality 
involving a pedestrian and an autonomous car—altered everything.  Since then, 
Uber steadily has narrowed the scope of its autonomous vehicle operations.”165  
Consequently, clarity around the law is necessary to protect the growth of 
autonomous vehicle technology, which will benefit the public.166  The 
developing gap in tort liability for autonomous vehicles can be addressed by a 
brand-new tort: AI-Chaperone Liability.  But before this Comment presents this 
new tort, it will explore the technological wave with respective legal issues on 
the horizon for autonomous vehicles. 
A.  Autonomous Vehicles and the Need for a New Type of Strict Liability 
In 2018, Secretary Chao stated that “after several widely publicized crashes—
tragic incidences—nearly three-quarters of American drivers report that they’re 
afraid, they’re anxious to ride in a fully self-driving vehicle[.]”167  As 
motivational speaker Denis Waitley would say: “Life is inherently risky.  There 
is only one big risk you should avoid at all costs, and that is the risk of doing 
nothing.”168  This especially holds true for the future of autonomous vehicles as 
“[w]aiting for the cars to perform flawlessly is a clear example of the perfect 
                                                 
Google at 20: From Search Engine to Self-Driving Cars: How Google Became a Pop Culture 
Phenomenon, MONEYCONTROL (Sept. 27, 2018, 6:39 PM), https://www.moneycontrol.com/ 
news/world/google-at-20-from-search-engine-to-self-driving-cars-how-google-became-a-pop-
culture-phenomenon-2992171-3.html (Waymo’s objective “is to fully integrate artificial 
intelligence with terrestrial transport, making the roads a safer place.”). 
 164. See Isaac et al., supra note 18. 
[Uber] started testing its autonomous vehicles in San Francisco in 2016, without a permit 
from California’s Division of Motor Vehicles.  The state agency ordered Uber to apply 
for a permit, but the company refused, saying permits were not necessary since safety 
drivers were monitoring the cars.  The D.M.V. ultimately revoked the registrations for 
the [sixteen] self-driving cars that Uber was testing in the city. 
Id. 
 165. Id. (“In May [2018], Uber announced that it was shutting its driverless testing hub in 
Arizona and laying off 300 employees.  A day later, preliminary findings from federal regulators 
investigating the crash confirmed . . . .  Uber’s self-driving car should have detected a pedestrian 
with enough time to stop[.]”). 
 166. Delphi Auto. PLC v. Absmeier, No. 15-cv-13966, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38212, at *10 
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2016). 
 167. James Doubek, Transportation Department Looks to Clear the Road for Cars Without 
Steering Wheels, NPR (Oct. 5, 2018, 7:46 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/05/654690893/ 
transportation-department-looks-to-clear-the-road-for-cars-without-steering-whee. 
 168. Denis Waitley, Denis Waitley Quotes, GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/ 
author/quotes/5108.Denis_Waitley (last visited Sept. 24, 2019); Denis Waitley, The Psychology of 
Winning: Ten Qualities of a Total Winner, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Denis-E-
Waitley/e/B001IU0USS/ref=dp_byline_cont_all_1 (last visited Oct. 10, 2019) (“Best-selling 
author and speaker, Denis Waitley has painted word pictures of optimism, core values, motivation 
and resiliency that have become indelible and legendary in their positive impact on society.”). 
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being the enemy of the good,” especially since it could lead to a safer world and 
Americans are already risking their lives by driving themselves.169 
In a 2015 survey, “Carnegie Mellon University found that . . . roughly 
[seventy] percent of drivers admitted to using their phones to text, read emails, 
and check social media while driving.”170  In 2017, approximately “37,133 
people were killed in car crashes on U.S. roads . . . .  A computer-driven car 
would ostensibly be safer—without drunk, tired or distracted drivers.”171 
A 2017 RAND study “using computer modeling . . . compared three 
scenarios: one where driverless cars were just [ten percent] safer than human 
drivers, one where they were [seventy-five percent] better and one where they 
were ‘nearly perfect,’ or [ninety percent] better.”172  The conclusion was that in 
no “scenario [does] it makes sense to wait until the vehicles are perfect,” rather 
early adoption of the autonomous vehicles will save lives.173  Researchers found 
that in both short- and long-term scenarios (fifteen and thirty years, 
respectively), “more lives were saved by quickly adopting the driverless cars 
that were just [ten percent] better . . . .  The difference was ‘significant,’ ranging 
from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of saved lives[.]”174 
There is a possibility that autonomous vehicles will be more law-abiding than 
human drivers, who can neglect to follow traffic laws and social mores of the 
road.175  In late 2018, news coverage included stories of at least five children 
who died while at bus stops because they were hit by drivers and “[a]t least seven 
other children were hurt in bus stop incidents.”176  Before the coronavirus 
                                                 
 169. See Melissa Bauman, Why Waiting for Perfect Autonomous Vehicles May Cost Lives, 
RAND CORP. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.rand.org/blog/articles/2017/11/why-waiting-for-
perfect-autonomous-vehicles-may-cost-lives.html (“[M]ore than [ninety] percent of crashes are 
caused by human error,” e.g., “speeding, miscalculating other drivers’ behaviors, or driving 
impaired.”). 
 170. Moor, supra note 4 (“Carnegie Mellon University found that passengers say they would 
spend most of their time in a driverless car looking at their mobile devices.”). 
 171. Doubek, supra note 167; but see Leslie Albrecht, How Driverless Cars Could Save Lives 
Even Sooner Than We Think, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 21, 2018, 3:34 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-driverless-cars-could-save-lives-even-sooner-than-we-
think-2017-11-07 (“Self-driving cars will . . . have their own set of problems, such as attacks by 
hackers or hardware or software snafus[.]”). 
 172. Albrecht, supra note 171. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (“In one model, autonomous vehicles that were [ten percent] safer were introduced to 
the marketplace in 2035 and saved 600,000 lives over the following [thirty-five] years.  By 2070, 
there would be 1.5 million car crash fatalities if the driverless cars were on the road, compared with 
2.1 million fatalities” without them.). 
 175. Autonomous vehicle developers do not require immunity, as they already have the 
incentive to develop this technology quickly, and the risk of liability encourages better design.  
Surden & Williams, supra note 138, at 178. 
 176. Emanuella Grinberg, Getting to and from a Bus Stop May Be More Dangerous Than the 
Actual Ride to School.  Here’s Why, CNN: HEALTH (Nov. 2, 2018, 12:08 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/02/health/school-bus-stop-safety/index.html (“Charlie Hood, 
executive director of the National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services, 
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pandemic that stopped children from going to school,177 “[o]n a single school 
day . . . [twenty percent] of bus drivers reported that nearly 84,000 vehicles 
passed their buses illegally[.]”178  Data indicates that “[t]he number of pedestrian 
fatalities increased [twenty-seven] percent from 2007 to 2016, while at the same 
time, all other traffic deaths decreased by [fourteen] percent.”179  Although right 
now people are encouraged to practice social distancing and stay inside, the 
world outside is already reopening;180 thus, children and pedestrians at large 
must continue to be protected from human drivers. 
In fact, it is more essential than ever to start creating a plan of action for tort 
liability from autonomous vehicles as “pedestrians remain just as susceptible to 
sustaining serious or fatal injuries when struck by a motor vehicle.”181  This 
growing danger has led to increased worries of tort liability, and the fear of 
“liability in accident scenarios resulting from unpredictability and lack of 
communication—such as those described—might be incentive enough to induce 
those firms that are developing autonomous vehicles to focus on the issue of 
unpredictability with more intent.”182 
                                                 
or NASDPTS[,]” said, “[c]hildren ‘are most vulnerable when they are pedestrians[.]’”).  Although 
these specific occurrences tend to be criminal instead of civil, they demonstrate the dangers of 
having a human driver behind the wheel.  See Madeline Holcombe, 5 Children Have Been Killed 
in 3 Days Waiting for School Buses, CNN (Nov. 2, 2018, 3:21 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/02/us/school-bus-accident-5-times-3-days/index.html. 
 177. Henry Dodd, ‘I Can’t Believe I am Going to Say this, but I Would Rather Be at School’, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/us/school-at-home-students-
coronavirus.html. 
 178. Grinberg, supra note 176 (“Results of the NASDPTS’ annual survey have fluctuated 
between 75,000 and 85,000 errant vehicles since 2011 in what Hood called an ‘unfortunately 
consistent’ pattern to a seemingly ‘intractable’ problem.”).  Unfortunately, drivers seem to simply 
disregard basic rules of the road, as: 
In most states, drivers are required to stop and wait for a stopped school bus with flashing 
lights and a raised stop arm, except where provisions for multilane highways apply.  In 
at least two incidents this week—in Indiana, where three siblings were killed, and in 
Tallahassee, where a kindergartner reportedly was hurt—police said the bus’s stop arm 
was raised when drivers struck the children. 
Id. 
 179. RICHARD RETTING & SAM SCHWARTZ CONSULTING, PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC FATALITIES 
BY STATE: 2017 PRELIMINARY DATA 3 (Feb. 2018), https://www.ghsa.org/sites/default/files/2018-
03/pedestrians_18.pdf (“Pedestrian deaths as a proportion of total motor vehicle crash deaths 
increased steadily, from [eleven] percent in 2007 to [sixteen] percent in 2016.”). 
 180. Isaac Chotiner, How to Maintain Social Distance as the U.S. Reopens, NEW YORKER 
(May 25, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/how-to-social-distance-as-america-
opens-back-up. 
 181. RETTING ET AL., supra note 179, at 6. 
 182. Surden & Williams, supra note 138, at 179. 
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B.  AI-Chaperone Liability 
AI-Chaperone Liability will in some ways allow what works best in traditional 
tort law to be applied to a new context.  Every so often tort law expands, and 
this generation requires a strict liability tort for the act of AI-chaperoning.183 
AI-Chaperone Liability occurs when 
(1) One who acts as a chaperone for AI that is performing a 
traditionally human task “is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused”184 to another or another’s property, if 
(a) the chaperone has either supervisory authority over 
or may override the AI device/system, and 
(b) the one harmed is responsible for any part of the 
harm experienced, then damages may be reduced. 
(2) “The rule stated in Subsection (1)”185 uses the following 
definitions: 
(a) “artificial intelligence” is “the capability of a 
machine to imitate intelligent human behavior”;186 
(b) “chaperone” is any entity “who accompanies and 
looks after”187 the AI device/system; and 
                                                 
 183. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 284–85 (Cal. 1952) 
(finding a new intentional tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Artificial Intelligence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/artificial%20intelligence (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).  In Section 238(g) of the John S. 
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Congress defined “artificial 
intelligence” as: 
(1) Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable 
circumstances without significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and 
improve performance when exposed to data sets. 
(2) An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, or other 
context that solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, 
communication, or physical action. 
(3) An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, including cognitive 
architectures and neural networks. 
(4) A set of techniques, including machine learning, that is designed to approximate a 
cognitive task. 
(5) An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent software agent 
or embodied robot that achieves goals using perception, planning, reasoning, learning, 
communicating, decision making, and acting. 
H.R. Con. Res. 5515, 115th Cong. (2018) § 238(g)(1)–(g)(5) (enacted), https://www.congress.gov/ 
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515/text. 
 187. Chaperone, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/chaperone (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
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(c) “traditionally human task” is any behavior that was 
performed by a human before the automation of the 
function. 
Under AI-Chaperone Liability, an entity who has clear authority over a 
device/system operating AI (e.g., an autonomous vehicle, a drone, etc.) may be 
a person, corporation, or similar.  This chaperone likely will have the option to 
override the AI and take back control, if necessary, at least until the technology 
is nearly flawless.  (On the other hand, an override feature may become a 
permanent fixture in AI due to humans’ distrust over technology and loss of 
agency.)  Additionally, the AI must perform a traditionally human function such 
as driving a vehicle or delivering packages door-to-door.  In other words, the AI 
assumes the job typically done by a human; these jobs have familiar names such 
as “driver” or “delivery person.”  If this feels uncomfortable, it should not.  After 
all, computers used to be people.188  Moreover, the AI must injure another (i.e., 
a person) or the instrument belonging to another in a way similar to “bodily 
harm” in a battery claim or “breach” in a negligence claim.  But if that other 
individual was responsible for the experienced injury, then liability may be 
reduced, if the compensatory system is similar to that for comparative 
negligence. 
AI-Chaperone Liability combines the best elements of the traditional torts and 
fills in the gap in liability left by them.  Unlike the intentional tort of battery, 
there is no “intent” requirement here.  Unlike negligence, AI-Chaperone 
Liability has no causal link necessary.  But even if there is no defect in the 
product (i.e., AI software) as required by products liability, under AI-Chaperone 
Liability, a person may still be held liable in a similar fashion as found when 
applying res ipsa loquitur.  As vicarious liability does not work easily with the 
human-machine relationship (e.g., a driver cannot delegate his or her duty to the 
autonomous vehicle’s AI software), AI-Chaperone Liability places the 
responsibility on a person who acts as a chaperone over AI.  AI-Chaperone 
Liability adapts strict liability and applies it to the expanding future of AI. 
AI-Chaperone Liability would apply to the March 2018 Uber accident 
because: 
 The chaperone is both Uber and its respective test driver. 
 The AI device/system is the autonomous vehicle. 
 The traditionally human task is driving. 
 The physical harm caused to another is the contact with the pedestrian. 
 Uber and its respective test driver have supervisory authority over or may 
override the AI device/system. 
                                                 
 188. See Ashley Hamer, The First Computers Were People, CURIOSITY (Dec. 17, 2016), 
https://curiosity.com/topics/the-first-computers-were-people-curiosity/ (“Before the advent of 
modern computers, the math behind some of science’s greatest achievements had to be done by 
hand.  This laborious work wasn’t done by the scientists themselves—it was done by human 
computers, who were often women.”). 
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 The woman who died after walking across the highway and who did not 
use the cross walk was responsible for part of the harm experienced, so 
damages may be reduced. 
In this scenario, Uber may not be the only one responsible for the result of the 
accident.  The pedestrian acted irresponsibly.  Of course, AI-Chaperone Liability 
requires a mechanism for how liability would be shared among multiple 
plaintiffs or defendants with a joint tortfeasor liability system, but that could be 
as easy as copying a contributory negligence or comparative negligence regime. 
C.  Making AI-Chaperone Liability the Law of the Land 
Conflicting state and local laws and regulations around automated vehicles 
introduce their own obstacles to this regime: they “create confusion, introduce 
barriers and present compliance challenges.”189  If the federal government waits 
for state statutes and state common law to figure out how to deal with artificial 
intelligence torts, the American public could suffer due to a patchwork of 
laws.190  What happens when one state has a law, yet another does not?  After 
all, “the form of state law development contemplated by Erie, under which ‘the 
voice adopted by the State as its own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its 
Supreme Court) should utter the last word’ on state law” becomes a very gray 
area.191  Courts may decide parties are not liable, simply because the law is 
silent.192  A federal statute could preempt all individual state laws on this topic, 
and the consistency of a single law would allow companies designing 
autonomous vehicles a more predictable regime of liability to follow.193  
                                                 
 189. DOT, supra note 2, at v. 
 190. For example, the coronavirus pandemic has been stifled by a patchwork response. 
A patchwork was inevitable, especially when a pandemic unfolds over a nation as large 
as the U.S.  But the White House has intensified it by devolving responsibility to the 
states . . . .  But in a pandemic, the actions of [fifty] uncoordinated states will be less than 
the sum of their parts.  Only the federal government has pockets deep enough to fund the 
extraordinary public-health effort now needed.  Only it can coordinate the production of 
medical supplies to avoid local supply-chain choke points, and then ensure that said 
supplies are distributed according to need, rather than influence. 
Ed Yong, America’s Patchwork Pandemic is Fraying Even Further, ATLANTIC DAILY (May 20, 
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/05/patchwork-pandemic-states-
reopening-inequalities/611866/. 
 191. Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 267 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)). 
 192. Id. (There was no liability as Texas law has not spoken directly about “a smartphone’s 
effect on a user as a substantial factor in the user’s tortious acts.”). 
 193. See DOT, supra note 2, at 6. 
Compliance with the Federal safety standard does not automatically exempt any person 
from liability at common law, including tort liability for harm caused by negligent 
conduct, except where preemption may apply.  The Federal standard would supersede if 
the effect of a State law tort claim would be to impose a performance standard on a motor 
vehicle or equipment manufacturer that is inconsistent with the Federal standard. 
Id. 
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Alternatively, it might be best to allow each state to determine the novel question 
of AI tort law through its legislature via statute or its highest court via common 
law.  This may allow the future state of tort law to have several different petri 
dishes to experiment on, with the control being our current state of tort law.194 
Another path forward might be to lobby for the addition of AI-Chaperone 
Liability to the Restatements (Third) of Torts, which is currently being drafted 
piecemeal by ALI.195  This is especially important, as “ALI drafts, discusses, 
revises, and publishes Restatements of the Law . . . that are enormously 
influential in the courts and legislatures, as well as in legal scholarship and 
education.”196  Finally, it may be possible to provide guidance to DOT, with its 
rulemaking authority and public comments process to create regulations that 
have the authority of law.197  After all, the administrative process can be the 
fastest way to get safer autonomous vehicles that are less likely to engage in 
tortious conduct. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the safety advantages of AI, “[t]he car won’t get it right every time, 
especially not in these early days.”198  Uber’s March 2018 crash sheds light on 
“at least two serious flaws in Uber’s self-driving system: software that’s not yet 
ready to replace humans, and humans that are ill-equipped to keep their would-
be replacements from doing harm.”199  It is only a matter of time though, and the 
autonomous vehicle will get it right sooner if the tort system keeps developers 
and the industry accountable.  The United States must be prepared and ready 
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citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.  This Court has the power to prevent an experiment.  
We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the 
measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. 
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OF TORTS § 1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Portions of this work are superseded by the 
Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2010/2012), 
Apportionment of Liability (2000), and Products Liability (1998).”). 
 196. About ALI, supra note 195. 
 197. See Rulemaking Process, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/ 
regulations/rulemaking-process (last updated May 15, 2019) (“Rulemaking is a process for 
developing and issuing rules (rules are also referred to as ‘regulations.’).  The process can lead to 
the issuance of a new rule, an amendment to an existing rule, or the repeal of an existing rule.”). 
 198. Marshall & Davies, supra note 19. 
 199. Id. 
370 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69.2:1 
with a tort system that covers artificial intelligence torts.  AI-Chaperone Liability 
certainly will fit the bill and bring strict liability into the twenty-first century. 
